rejection of non-Islamic models, Qutb in fact borrowed from Western ideas in seeking to advance his scripturalist positions-especially in regard to matters of social justice. This is not to suggest that Muslims had not developed a concept of justice. Indeed, justice (cadl) is a major concept in the Islamic heritage. However, classical texts and commentaries restricted the concept within a narrow compass until the 1940s, when it suddenly made its appearance in the form of social justice.
It is also ironic that, despite his repudiation of Islamic philosophy, Qutb's own thought is suffused with organicism, one of the dominant attributes of that philosophy-which was strongly influenced by Greek organic notions.'3 His works repeatedly refer to Islam as movement (haraka), vitality (hayawiyya), evolution (tatawwur), and growth (namda'). Attacking philosophers who seek secular knowledge, Qutb states: "We seek the movement (al-haraka) behind knowledge."'4 He writes of an Islamic method (manhaj islaml) that is distinctive for its dynamism, rhythm, and touch. The metaphor of growth (physis) that is so central to Greek thought is also basic to Qutb's view of Islam, whose outlook (tasawwur) posits harmonious interaction between nature and man. Islam, for Qutb, is a system that consists of an "organic and dynamic fusion" (tajammuc haraki Cudwj).l5 This seemingly means an aggregation of committed Muslims who unite their ideas and actions to worship God. The whole (tajammuc) is greater than the sum of its parts, just as a human life is greater than the sum of the body's physical structure and its mental passageways. The following passage is instructive: To summarize, then, Qutb reifies Islam, endowing it with beliefs and actions that are aggregated in an organic dynamic fusion. Islam grows and exhibits life processes. Islam is, then, an independent, functioning entity (as opposed to a collectivity of individual Muslims who decide to act in the world). Though an actor, Islam is not subject to temporal processes, including entropy. Presumably it retains its vitality because of the mechanisms of renewal that are somehow immanent in it. Among these presumably are renewal (tajdid), the application of discretion by a judge in Islamic law (istihsan), and rulings based on public interest (maslaha mursala). That these mechanisms are actuated by actual people in actual historical times and places would appear to undermine his reification, although this seems not to be an issue for Qutb.
Earlier, I maintained that Qutb is a scripturalist who believed that classic texts are fixed truths with fixed meanings. However, matters are not so simple. Qutb himself makes a point of stressing that Islam is a realistic or practical religion. Two important words for him when qualifying Islam are waqi'i (actual, realistic) and Camali (practical). For example, he maintains that "this religion is a serious, dynamic, practical system [manhaj Camali haraki jddd]."'9 He states that Islam "came to govern life in its actuality [fi wdqiciha] and to face this actuality in order to make decisions regarding it-whether to keep, modify, or fundamentally change it."20 Therefore, he declares, "Islam legislates only for conditions that actually prevail."2' Islam "is not a theory that deals with suppositions but is a system that deals with actuality."22 In order to make sure that he is understood in the matter of the dynamism of Islam, he declares:
Islamic society is, thus, not a fixed historical model as to its form, size, and the kind of life that prevails there.... Islamic civilization can take various forms in its concrete structural manifestation, though the principles upon which it rests are fixed.... The forms of Islamic civilization that rest upon these fixed principles are influenced by the degree of economic and scientific progress, because these forms make use of what in fact is found in that civilization, whatever the environment.23
What is Qutb getting at? Is he saying that the laws of Islam are eternal, but their method of implementation changes according to different historical periods? His emphasis on Islam as a practical religion seems to be suggesting so. He says that in the Meccan period (610-22), the Muslims were urged to believe, but "they did not have an actual independent life so that they could have organized themselves according to Allah's law."24 However, in the Medinan period (622-61), the Muslims were provided with the laws that they needed because, at this time, "they had an empowered state" and "laws were revealed to them, and the system was established for them that met the actual needs of Muslim society."25
In distinguishing between the Meccan and Medinan periods, Qutb seems to imply that changes in historical time bring with them changes in the way people address Islam. But at the end of the day, this is not in fact what he believes. He actually maintains his scripturalist identity, because in the Meccan period, there were no laws to obey, just beliefs to hold. Accordingly, the way to implement the laws could not have changed across the two periods because it was only in the Medinan era that the Prophet promulgated actual laws.
Moreover, because Qutb's late writings hold that everything that had happened after 661 (except for the rule of 'Umar II from 717 to 720) was jdhili,26 it is the Medinan era that stands as the unique exemplar for contemporary Egypt of Islamic state and law. This means that one has no choice but to apply the fixed truths of the Medinan model per se (there being no other models of true Islam) if one is interested in changing the Egyptian realities of the late 20th century (or any time period after A.D. 661, for that matter).
Furthermore, note Qutb's unit of analysis. It is "Islam" that "has come to regulate the affairs of life in their actuality."27 It is "Islam" that "faces this actuality in order to make judgments about it with its commands."28 Thus, if one is arguing that Qutb insists on the historicity of the application of the law-according to which the method of application may vary from one era to the next-one must somehow explain why Qutb is unwilling to accept the possibility that human beings might freely wish to interpret matters in non-scripturalist ways. Distributive justice, with its roots in Plato and the Greeks, is embedded in the concept of natural law. The law of nature applies to a system of right or justice held to be common to all human beings. Enlightenment writers argued that natural law superseded the laws of religion and the state. Combining these considerations with notions of social contract, philosophers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau held that as individuals entered into such contracts, they did not cede their natural rights to a ruler but to society as a whole. Thus, society became the guarantor of the rights of its members to freedom, equality, and social justice. In all this, there is no accommodation of divine law.
In the Qur'anic tradition, according to 4:58, "Allah commands you to return trusts to their owners." This is usually interpreted to mean that Allah has vouchsafed to human beings, his vice-gerants, certain "deposits" or "trusts." These temporarily bestowed trusts (amdnat) include such things as knowledge and the law of God, which must be returned to Allah and the Prophet (their "owners"). By contrast, natural-law and social-contract theorists held that it is society that is the trustee and human beings who, as the trustors, have vouchsafed their deposits (i.e., their justice, freedom, equality, and pursuit of happiness) to this society. Consequently, it is society that must render the trusts to their owners-that is, to individuals. This notion is, of course, completely antithetical to the Qur'anic view, which holds Allah-not his vice-gerants-to be the trustor. Accordingly, the Arabic term al-'adala al-ijtimd'iyya-"social justice"-is a 20th-century neologism coined by Muslim writers taking cues from ideas imported from abroad. Islamic scripture (the Qur'an and sunna) simply did not reflect within its rich tradition such a thoroughly anthropocentric concept as social justice. In the Qur'an, the noun form 'adala-justice-does not appear. Instead, the root, 'a-d-l, appears in the verbal perfect, imperfect, and imperative forms (Cadala/ yacdilu/icdil), and in the noun form ('adl). As a verb, it means to proportion, create in symmetry; to be just, equitable; to offer an equivalent; to swerve; to ascribe equals [to God]. In the noun form, it means counterpoise, equivalent; justice; equity. Thus, 'adl in the meaning of "justice" and "equity" does appear in the scriptures but lacks a social dimension. In 2:282, the word qualifies a scribe writing down the terms of a contract in a just manner or a guardian explaining a contract in a just manner to a mentally deficient individual. In 4:3, believers are admonished to act justly toward orphaned girls by marrying the ones who are lawful to the Muslims in order to prevent their abuse. Later (4:129), Allah warns Muslims that they will not be able to treat multiple wives equitably and hence should marry only one. Later yet (4:135), Allah admonishes Muslims not to let lust make them swerve from justice.
At other points, Allah commands the Prophet to judge equitably among people (al-nas) (4:58) or to arbitrate equitably among two warring factions (49:9). In 5:8, Allah orders believers not to let hatred for others cause them to deviate from justice and warns them to be just. The term Cadl is also used to refer to "two persons of equity" in regard to determining appropriate compensation for killing game while on the pilgrimage (5:95); witnessing the signature of a will (5:106); or witnessing a man's divorcing his wife without violating the injunction not to do so during a woman's pregnancy (65:2).
On some occasions, the justice in question refers to Allah's words, held to be perfect in truth and justice (6:115) or deemed as enjoining justice (16:90). In 6:152, Allah commands people always to speak with justice. In 7:159, reference is made to certain followers of Moses who "show the way to the truth and deal justly in accordance with it." More generically, in 7:181, Allah says that He has "created people who lead [others] to truth and act justly in its light." And in 7:15, the Prophet is commanded to tell the faithful that he has been ordered to act with justice (or possibly with "equivalence") toward them. In a final case, the word refers to the difference between a dumb man and a man who is "just" and follows the right path (16:76).
Most of these references are to Allah's conduct; to discrete, individualized relationships among individuals involving quite specific aspects of private life, or to very abstract notions of equity in people's general behavior. In the two cases in which the arena in which justice is to be exercised seems to be a public one (4:58 and 49:9), the "social" dimension is still missing. In 4:58, the word nas (people) is an abstract term lacking notions of corporate personality and rights that inhere when one speaks of social justice for a group in a modern sense. Instead, Allah commands that those who judge must do so "in a just manner" (bi-l-adl) toward an abstract entity referred to as "the people." In fact, Qutb's own commentary on this verse stresses that the referent of al-nas in this passage is "each individual as an individual."33 If Qutb had social justice in mind, one would think that he would try to introduce the concept of a citizenry rather than refer to atomistic "individuals as individuals." As for 49:9-arbitrating with justice in relationship to warring factions-the justice that is bespoken is akin to fair-mindedness. This is not the meaning of social justice as it is understood in the modern sense, which is a matter of a collectivity whose members share interests, constitute themselves as a corporate group, and struggle to promote those interests in the arena of civil society.34
In the sunna, the noun form 'adala appears only once in the eight major codices of Sunni hadith.35 This lone reference is in the phrase, "for these are people of steadfastness and justice" (wa hd'uld' ahl al-thabt wa-al-addla).36 The characterization, "people of ... justice" qualifies a group of people who behave equitably in terms of accepted understandings of ethical behavior. It does not carry the connotations of a corporate unit to which accrues the legal right and standing to demand justice as a matter of the interest of the corporate whole.
In a recent study, Toby E. Huff holds that in Islamic tradition, considerations of justice are adumbrated by reference to the "highly particularistic . .. treating all cases according to the particularities of the case and the individual . .. thereby refrain[ing] from establishing a set of uniform and universal principles of fairness and justice." As Joseph Schacht puts it: "The aim of Islamic law is to provide concrete and material standards, not to impose formal rules on the play of contending interests."37
The reason that it is important to stress this point about the silence of the scripture on the theme of social justice is that Qutb maintains that the Muslim can find everything necessary for his well-being there.38 Although Qutb occasionally refers to the fuqaha' of later generations to support some points that he wishes to make,39 the overwhelming majority of his references are to the Qur'anic and sunna texts.
It may be maintained that justice takes on a social dimension in the writing of alGhazali (within the framework of his theory of virtue) and that, therefore, Qutb is drawing from the Islamic tradition after all. However, as Mohamed Ahmed Sherif notes, when al-Ghazali does talk about justice, his emphasis is on justice in respect to character traits. It is true that he speaks about the religious law and the need to observe it, but justice for him is important because it is the virtue of the soul which Hanafi believes that Qutb would have become a member of the "Islamic Left" had he lived.5' He is sympathetic to much in Qutb's perspective, both praising him52 and accepting many of Qutb's premises, including, for example, the belief that Islam was the first socialist religion.53 Hanafi maintains that Qutb's apparent extremism stemmed directly from his torture. However, as Abu Zayd notes, this would not explain why others such as Mawdudi, who had never suffered torture, adopted similar positions. Hanafi, however, takes significantly different positions from Qutb, especially in regard to the importance of philosophy and rationalism in human history and society. Whereas Hanafi speaks of the "enlightened thinker" and "enlightened reason," Qutb insists on "servitude" (CubCudiyya) and warns against the danger of secularism that lurks insidiously in the interstices of rationalist discourse.54 Hanafi could not disagree more. In a forceful passage, Hanafi wonders:
There is no doubt that if we wanted to get into a bidding competition in regard to belief and defending Allah, razing [the edifice of] reason and cancelling out the human being, we would say that Allah rules over the mind and that the mind is the object that is governed; that Allah is the creator of it, the possessor of all things, the ruler of all things. But where can the danger be? What is the situation in which we find ourselves? Is Allah in danger? Or is reason? Do we defend Allah's hadkimiyya or the hdkimiyya of reason? Are we defenders of Allah or are we human beings defending human rights? It may be that the human being, in the presence of this bidding competition, will keep silent in fear of the coercion of the masses, the weight of history, and the attack of the rulers. However, defending the rule of reason is the task of our generation, defending the rights of the people [al-nds] and employing their minds.55
Hence, not surprisingly Hanafi disagrees with Qutb's implicit requirement that "true" Muslims pronounce unbelief (takfir) upon "false" believers. One of Hanafi's major goals is to transcend mutual recriminations in regard to pronouncing unbelief and apostasy upon people.56 Hanafi's own purpose is the reconstruction of Islamic civilization, a task he assigns to himself. In a remarkable comparison, his publisher maintains that Hanafi's project is comparable to Ibn Khaldun's examination of the rise and fall of civilizations for the purpose of regenerating Islam.57 One finds a certain instrumentalism in Hanafi insofar as his treatment of the turath is concerned. Seemingly, he wants to fashion the turdth into an ideology. As such, this turdth becomes a repository from which to draw ideas and deploy them as weapons to stake out interests in historical time and place.58
Hanafi wants to reconstitute the tradition of the ancestors (al-salaf) so that the human being and history are placed at the center of concern. "The Science of the Hanafi maintains that early Muslims knew the importance of theory as the basis of all action.62 These adepts worked through the complex of ideas that was raised before them by the Prophet-not in some abstracted manner, divorced from the historical conditions in which they lived, but, on the contrary, by reference to these conditions. In this manner, early Muslims did not consider Allah as a mental construct to be confirmed or disconfirmed. In a remarkable passage, Hanafi says that for them, Allah is a project of humanity [mashri' al-insdniyya] the realization of which this humanity has tried to effect from its inception until now. Allah is the progress of history in the creation of which human beings have a share. Allah is not a subject whose existence can be rationally proved but rather is history which progresses, reality which moves, and masses who make revolution.63
Qutb would surely reject this assessment of Allah as somehow subsumed in human history. He would hold that it is a classic case of jahill thinking, the more inimical to the Muslims' interests because it is advanced by one whom he would regard as a nominal believer.
But for Hanafi, any other interpretation is a prescription for continued stagnation. Unfortunately, he maintains, this patent historicity of Islam and the role of the Muslims eventually became undone in favor of a perspective that abstracted the faith and its believers from the world of reality into some hypostatization. How did things reach this pass? Why is it that, as Hanafi sees it, Muslims are unable to understand their situation in ways that will enable them to generate creative solutions to their present problems? The short answer is the "tyranny" of Ash'arite ontology and epistemology, which, despite its Mu'tazilite contenders, sealed its victory through the efforts of the great Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1 11 1).64 Ashcari authoritarian control over the sharica in the service of the ruling classes can be ended only by a constructive critique of the entire "heritage." Otherwise, spontaneity by itself, as the left has long argued, can achieve only so much.
For Hanafi, contemporary Arab society is divided into two parts, one represented by the movement known as the salafiyya, the other by secularism. He sees his contribution to overcoming their sterile confrontation as freeing the salafis from their rigid orientation toward the past (ittiba'), and as reforming the reprehensible innovations (bidca) of the secularists.65
Hanafi believes that the "heritage" is the basis of contemporary awareness in society and calls it the "psychological storehouse" of the masses. In focusing on the elements of the "heritage" that are in need of "renewal" (tajdid) Hanafi is motivated by the needs of the present. For Hanafi, the "heritage" by itself has no inherent value. Its worth is measured by being the source for generating a scientific theory of action that can be put to use for the individual's benefit. This seems somewhat like secularism, but secularism interests itself in human progress without regard to religious knowledge and experience, a disregard that Hanafi, of course, rejects. Here is how he puts it: Every era, he notes, shapes its culture and its conceptions. The conceptions of the ancestors (al-salaf) were purely historical ones, expressing the realities of their time and level of culture. The same process is at work in the contemporary period. But the two processes do not operate in mutual isolation. The relationship between them is a dialectical one of nonconnection and connection. Hanafi says that we necessarily start from our own time period and look back on our past. In doing that, we find in our past the reasons for our current problems, for the decline and breakdowns that we are currently witnessing. "It is as though we choose from the old only what we want."68 Thus, Hanafi seems to be proposing a rather pragmatic course: select from the heritage those elements that seem to make sense and are also relevant for current problems. If we do this, then we can avoid trying to achieve the impossible, returning to a golden age in wholesale fashion. What is to ensure that Hanafi's process of selection does not become unmanageable? He presumably would maintain that one would be guided by the categories of 'Ilm Usul al-Din, and not by phenomena divorced from that theological foundation. Those categories, as noted earlier, include oral traditions; the religious sciences; the oneness of Allah; the essence, attributes, and names of Allah; the religious ordinances; the contingency of human action; prophecy; day of judgment; and the imamate. But that still leaves the scope for choice rather wide. Contemporary problems in Islamic societies include illiteracy, hunger, poverty, overcrowding, maldistribution of wealth, and authoritarian rule. What aspects of kalam can one draw upon to confront and begin to solve some of these problems? Moreover, who is to do the selecting?
Yet the process is not totally ungoverned, Hanafi maintains. In his view, the movement from the present to the past, which he characterizes as an "ascending movement," is mediated by what he calls the "psychological storehouse" of the masses. By this, he seems to mean that the ordinary Muslim has a certain stock of appreciation and understanding of the heritage as he or she looks back on the past for guidelines for current behavior. On the other side of this is the movement from the past to the present, which he characterizes as a "descending movement," and it is mediated by what he terms "consciousness" (shu'ur).
To summarize this, then, as the Muslim moves back in time, he or she draws on his or her "psychological storehouse" of values and symbols, based on his or her understanding of that heritage. Then, armed with the appropriate elements of the old kalam, he or she moves forward in time toward the present again. This time, though, instead of drawing upon his or her psychological storehouse, he or she applies his or her perceptions and awareness of current-day problems in terms of the model solutions that the elements of the heritage with which he or she is armed can provide. It is this supposedly dynamic process-seeing the relevance of the past for the present and projecting the problems of the present into the past-that will allow Muslims finally to address and solve their most pressing concerns.
Hanafi boldly asserts that the tragedy of the Muslims lies in a mechanical following of the models of the past. His solution is the "Islamic left," whose discourse, he believes, derives from human reality and history, not some disembodied, abstracted sacrality (qaddsa) existing outside of history. According to Hanafi's line of argument, the heritage is not a cluster of fixed theoretical truths. Truths become such only in specific times and places. The "heritage" is thus the sum of the validations (tahaqquqdt) of these theoretical truths in specific historical times and places, validations effected by the behavior of individuals. This being so, then the old truths are always subject to reevaluation at later historical times and places. Here, he feels, is Islam's mechanism for genuine change and renewal. Too many people say "Let us return to the past." Hanafi avers, "Let us use the past to understand the present but abandon those aspects of the past that are not relevant, replacing them with truths whose foundations may be in the past but which otherwise are put in the service of present needs. For example, suppose Hanafi tells us that more democracy, as embodied in the concept of "consultation" (shurd), is needed in the present to solve some of the problems of society. He tells us this because, in his opinion, in the early years of Islam one could find the roots of democracy in the shiurd idea. Yet he avoids showing how the roots of democracy actually were developed in those early years through a close historical analysis of groups, movements, and ideas. Did shiiur indeed evolve from a struggle of people in specific circumstances, or is shurd something that is counseled by Allah and the Prophet for the purpose of a fuller understanding of Allah's laws? If the latter, then it does not have much to do with democracy. If the former, then it is necessary for Hanafi to provide the specifics of the historical struggles that led to the understanding of shuird in more than a purely divine, revelational context. One cannot simply look at texts (the Qur'an and sunna) in that early period from a contemporary perspective and find "democracy" in the texts. For that is tantamount to abandoning the historicity of texts.
Similarly, it could be that the value of equity-for example-pertained to ethical injunctions to be upright in relations with Allah, one's family members, and neighbors by not dissimulating to them. According to this view, too much wealth in the hands of one person could greatly complicate one's chances of being upright in relations with one's God, family members, and close neighbors. Yet stated as such, this has nothing to do with equity at the community level. What Hanafi wants to do is discover in the heritage the value of equity and use it to solve the problem of pervasive poverty in Egypt today. But to do this, he would have to show that the value of equity was used in this way by the early Muslims. To do that, in turn, Hanafi needs to show us how people in the early period struggled with one another at given historical junctures to vindicate the idea that equity in the early period conveyed the sense of obligations by putative citizens of the community to arrogate to that community as a social unit the authority and legitimacy to redistribute wealth in defense of its interests as a corporate whole against contending and competing interests. Hanafi cannot simply assume that this orientation to equity inhered in early times and so can be culled from the past and applied in the current period.
To be sure, Hanafi says that his method avoids these problems and takes into account that those early texts came to be written in historical time and place. This implies that comprehending them requires an understanding of the forces that went into their production. However, he does not seem to provide a historically grounded analysis of this sort. What is missing is an explanation of people's behavior and ideas in concrete historical junctures and in interaction with social, economic, and political groups, movements, and institutions. Hence, he may ironically be said to have committed the same error of ahistoricity of which he accuses the scripturalists.
Hanafi's dialectic of change is abstract and diffuse. The same is not true of his outline of action on behalf of that change. It is true that he has a rather utopian objective for the "Islamic Left"-to awaken the Muslims and achieve a revolution through a scholarly critique of the heritage.70 But when contemplating the actual implementation of a revolution, he raises aloft the familiar banner of the left. Borrowing a page from Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, he writes that Islamic reformers have basically tried merely to understand the world, whereas it is now important to change it.7' However, in order to effect such a change, one cannot rely only on ideas. Ultimately adopting a Leninist position, he declares that it is important to establish a revolutionary party organization for mass mobilization. Once a leadership is established for this organization, it will engage in raising the consciousness of the people. This eventually will be followed by armed struggle for full liberation from colonialism, feudalism, and other evils. Again in rather utopian manner, he insists that the party will truly represent the masses, not a particular class or group. In colorful terminology, Hanafi maintains that this party is the "caliph of Allah's chosen people."72 Qutb's view of the dynamic of the revolution is somewhat similar. He, too, speaks of a revolutionary "leadership" (qiyada),73 which has distinct leftist connotations. However, Qutb stops short of advocating a political party, contenting himself with the notion of emigration and establishing a countersociety on the periphery of existing jdhili society. Once sufficient numbers have come over, the process of total transformation to Islamic society will occur, peacefully if the state does not react with coercion-although Qutb was virtually certain that the state would use forceotherwise through violence. For Hanafi, it is important, in vindicating "Islamic" ends, to borrow as much from the heritage of the past as is suitable but then to supplement this with concepts and ideas from outside that heritage. Hanafi feels no constraints about analyzing his society through philosophical lenses that are shaped by the major intellectual movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, beyond the boundaries of the umma.
As for practical results, both take a revolutionary position. For Qutb, the model solutions to the problems confronting the Muslims today revolve around a rejection of the society in which they find themselves, a figurative and even literal migration from such a society, and the construction of the bases for a countersociety of piety and social action. For his part, Hanafi believes that his radical and recondite reconstruction of the heritage will be understood by the masses, and when that happens, they will be ready for mobilization. Bringing this to pass, however, will require a nucleus of dedicated leaders, whose task will be to inculcate the appropriate theoretical perspective and then lead the masses into action. Although both projects strike one as utopian, it may be premature to voice such a verdict, particularly-as both writers so frequently have declared-in light of the failure of liberal, corporatist, socialist, and Marxist models over the last century. 3Indeed, turdth involves not just sacred texts and commentaries on them but, in general, the whole legacy of the sacred and the nonsecular, including philosophy, literature, science, and popular culture. Turath does not appear frequently in Qutb's writings. His concerns are better captured by concepts such as al-tasawvwur al-islami, which, however, does cover some of the "terrain" of turdth as defined earlier, especially the sacred texts. Moreover, he insists that the phrase "judge justly among the people," is a "right" (haqq) to which these same people are entitled. He adds that the "justliness" (Cadl) that must characterize the judge's judgment toward the people is a "comprehensive" justliness (Cadl shamil). In this regard, I take him to be trying to broaden the concept so that it approximates more our modern concept of social justice.
34This is not to say that later on jurists did not devise mechanisms that might be considered creating the preliminary groundwork for the construction of an understanding of "social justice" in Islamic history. The main one that needs to be mentioned is the concept of maslaha mursala-or the public interest. If one can adduce the idea that a public interest inheres, then one can proceed to maintain that one element of the public interest is the achievement of social justice. 41Ibid., 72. 421It is also worth pointing out that Qutb was very cautious in regard to the role of maslaha mursala in Islamic law. Thus, he accepted the teachings of the Maliki school in this regard, rather than the more permissive Shafi'i teachings. This is because in the Maliki interpretation, ijtihad, or independent judgment to deduce a ruling of law, is circumscribed by rather salient restrictions, whereas the Shafi'i school is more open and tolerant of the usage of ijtihad and even-in its form as al-ijtihad al-tawfi accords precedence to it over the text. This bespeaks Qutb's reluctance to invoke the "secondary principles" for fear of violating the categorical imperative of the sanctity of the text (nass). See Abui Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dint, 67. In a way, Qutb's caution on ijtihad in relationship to occasions for which textual stipulation appears to exist seems to be contrary to his notion-already mentioned of Islam's "dynamic method" (manhaj haraki) and its "dynamic realism" ( In modern reformist movements [presumably the Salafiyya] attempts to reconstruct the theory of knowledge or to formulate the theoretical introduction to the science of usul al-din have not taken place as they did in the past. Instead, the theory of knowledge remained hidden, its place being taken by the description of the historical development of knowledge in order to know what is authentic and what is extraneous to it. The goal of defining the course of knowledge in history is to know how the transition occurs from unity to diffusion, from community to separatedness. so that we can transcend the current condition of diffusion and segmentation to the original condition of unity and community. As a consequence [of this transcendence] the science of usiul al-din will revert to being a guide for the conduct of the people toward action.
62It has been suggested that Qutb emphasized the importance of theory as the indispensable prerequisite of practice. This is reflected in his use of the word "conception" [tasawwur] . While it is true that Qutb was interested in theory, it is in a way that is different from Hanafi. Hanafi's theory is a critical theory, according to which subject matter is held to be problematical until demonstrated to the contrary. Qutb's theory is essentially an uncritical "Islamic conception" that becomes the template for human action. Action is Qutb's watchword, though the agent that acts is "Islam." 63Hanafi, Min al-'Aqldah ild al-Thawra, vol. I, 89. 64Richard Khuri, "A Critique of Hassan Hanafi Concerning His Reflections on the Scarcity of Freedom in the Arab-Muslim World," in Cultural Transitions, 86-115. Khuri explains that in Hanafi's view of history, "residues pile up" over the centuries, with lower levels acquiring great authoritativeness. Control over meaning has been exercised by a self-appointed group that has continued to exercise its power over the long course of history in Islamic societies. In a dialectical relationship, the Ash'arite-Ghazalian conceptions exercise their hold over the social group monopolizing power in society, and the social group in turn
